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Inconsistent Verdicts, Issue Preclusion, and
Settlement in the Presence of Judicial Bias
RICHARD HYNES
This Comment examines the effects of offensive, non-mutual issue preclu-
sion in the presence of judicial bias. If a litigant has litigated an issue and lost,
issue preclusion permits a later court to use the prior judgment to preclude the
litigant from relitigating the issue.' Courts may treat that issue as conclusively
established against the litigant in future litigation.
Issue preclusion prevents courts and litigants from wasting time and money
considering issues that have already been litigated2 and reduces the possibility
of inconsistent verdicts,3 which create considerable embarrassment for the legal
system. But issue preclusion is not without costs. One possible casualty is ac-
curacy.4 Issue preclusion may enhance the risk associated with a lawsuit by
possibly preserving an anomalous judgment or by making a compromise
verdict the basis of extensive liability in subsequent cases.
Traditionally, under the rule of mutuality, courts only applied issue
Richard Hynes is a J.D. candidate at the University of Chicago and a Ph.D. candidate in
the Department of Economics at the University of Pennsylvania. He would like to thank
Professor William Landes of the University of Chicago and Adam Gross for helpful com-
ments.
1. For a detailed explanation of issue preclusion, see Jack H. Friedenthal, Mary Kay
Kane, and Arthur R. Miller, Civil Procedure §§ 14.9-14.15 at 659-97 (West, 2d ed 1993);
Fleming James, Jr., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., and John Leubsdorf, Civil Procedure SS
11.17-11.26 at 607-25 (Little, Brown, 4th ed 1992).
2. Some courts have questioned whether issue preclusion saves courts and litigants
time and money. See, for example, Parklane Hosiery Co. v Shore, 439 US 322, 329-30
(1979) (suggesting that offensive issue preclusion may increase the amount of litigation
because it gives plaintiffs an incentive to "wait and see" the outcome in the first action,
rather than to intervene in the first action).
3. See, for example, Montana v United States, 440 US 147, 153-54 (1979) ("To
preclude parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate protects their adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple
lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing
the possibility of inconsistent decisions.").
4. Friedenthal, Kane, and Miller, Civil Procedure S 14.9 at 660 (cited in note 1)
("Collateral estoppel operates without regard to whether the first determination of a
particular issue was correct. The court does not concern itself with the rightness of the
finding.").
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preclusion in cases in which both parties had litigated in the previous suit.'
However, federal courts now allow non-mutual issue preclusion. Under non-
mutual issue preclusion, a court treats an issue as conclusively established even
though only one of the litigants was a party to the prior litigation." Thus,
non-mutual issue preclusion requires a party that expects to litigate an issue
more than once to consider not just the costs of a judgment in the present
case, but also the effects of the judgment on all future suits involving the same
issue.
Federal courts allow non-mutual issue preclusion to be used both defen-
sively7 and offensively.8 Under defensive, non-mutual issue preclusion, when
a plaintiff has previously litigated an issue and lost, courts permit the de-
fendant to use the prior judgment defensively by treating the issue as estab-
lished conclusively against future plaintiffs.9 Under offensive, non-mutual issue
preclusion, when a defendant has previously litigated an issue and lost, courts
permit new plaintiffs to use the prior judgment offensively, and they treat the
issue as established conclusively against the defendant."0 Therefore, under
offensive, non-mutual issue preclusion, if a defendant loses a case which turns
on an issue that will be determinative in future cases, the defendant may be
liable for the harms suffered by all future plaintiffs. This Comment focuses on
offensive, non-mutual issue preclusion. Offensive, non-mutual issue preclusion
is generally seen as more controversial than defensive, non-mutual issue pre-
clusion because it may increase litigation" and result in unfairness to a defen-
dant. 2
The Supreme Court's decision in Parklane Hosiery Co. v Shore permitted
offensive, non-mutual issue preclusion, but placed important limits on its
use.' Commentators have failed to consider carefully the effect of Parklanes
limitations. 4 Furthermore, these commentators have failed to consider serious-
5. James, Hazard, and Leubsdorf, Civil Procedure 5 11.25 at 619 (cited in note 1).
6. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v Univ of Ill Foundation, 402 US 313, 350 (1971)
(precluding a patentee from relitigating the validity of a patent already declared invalid in
prior litigation against alleged infringers); Parklane, 439 US at 329-31 (allowing plaintiffs
who had not been party to the previous suit to use a prior judgment against the de-
fendants).
7. Blonder-Tongue, 402 US at 350.
8. Parklane, 439 US at 331.
9. Friedenthal, Kane, and Miller, Civil Procedure S 14.4 at 692 (cited in note 1);
Black's Law Dictionary 261 (West, 6th ed 1990).
10. Id.
11. Parklane, 435 US at 329-30 (suggesting that offensive issue preclusion may increase
litigation because plaintiffs would adopt a "'wait and see' attitude" and refuse to intervene
in the first action).
12. Id at 330-31.
13. Id at 329-31.
14. One commentator assumed that courts would ignore the "inconsistent" limitation.
Note, Exposing the Extortion Gap: An Economic Analysis of the Rules of Collateral
Estoppel, 105 Harv L Rev 1940, 1947-48 (1992). The commentator justified this as-
sumption by citing to one case. Id at 1941 n 11 (citing to Mooney v Fibreboard Corp.,
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ly the effects of issue preclusion in the presence of judicial bias."5
I address these deficiencies by examining one of the important limitations
that Parklane places on offensive, non-mutual issue preclusion. Parklane held
that courts should not apply issue preclusion when prior verdicts are "inconsis-
tent" with one another. I will examine the effects of different interpretations
of the "inconsistent" verdicts limitation. In particular, I will examine the
effects of this limitation in the presence of judicial bias-when plaintiffs share
a common issue but do not have the same chance of prevailing on that issue.
I conclude that issue preclusion's impact on plaintiffs' and defendants'
desire to settle or litigate depends on how courts interpret the "inconsistent"
verdicts limitation. If the court in one prior case held for the defendant, but
another court in a similar case held for the plaintiff, a subsequent court might
or might not determine that the verdicts are inconsistent and so might or
might not refuse to use the second decision to preclude the defendant from
arguing an issue. In either case the defendant's expected liability would be
greater than if offensive, non-mutual issue preclusion were not permitted.
However, the increase in a defendant's expected liability due to offensive, non-
mutual issue preclusion will be reduced if courts interpret "inconsistent" so
that one verdict for a defendant substantially reduces the chance that the
defendant will be precluded from arguing an issue if a subsequent plaintiff
wins.
I also demonstrate that the "inconsistent" verdicts limitation heightens the
effect of any bias in the judicial system. The limitation creates an incentive for
defendants to settle with plaintiffs who have an above-average probability of
victory, and it reduces the incentive to settle with plaintiffs who have a very
low relative probability of'victory. As a result, issue preclusion helps those
plaintiffs who benefit from discrimination and may hurt those plaintiffs who
suffer most from discrimination.
In Section I, I discuss the initial abandonment of mutuality and the
importance of a party's "full and fair opportunity to litigate." In Section II, I
discuss the Supreme Court's "inconsistent" verdicts limitation and how the
lower courts have interpreted the limitation. In Section III, I present a model
for evaluating the effects of issue preclusion.
I explain my basic conclusions in a number of different ways. In Section
IV, I present the analysis in verbal form and explain the intuition. In Section
V, I present a numerical example to provide a sense of the magnitude of the
485 F Supp 242, 247-48 (E D Tex 1980)). Another commentator examined the role of
the "inconsistent" limitation and focussed on the incentive for parties to invest in litiga-
tion. Stephen J. Spurr, An Economic Analysis of Collateral Estoppel, 11 Intl Rev L &
Econ 47, 57-58 (1991). 1 place greater emphasis on settlement incentives.
15. One commentator developed a model that reflects the possibility that plaintiffs will
have different probabilities of prevailing at trial. Note, 105 Harv L Rev at 1946 (cited in
note 14). However, the commentator did not fully discuss the implications of this
assumption; nor did the commentator examine the effects of this bias in a legal system in
which courts applied the "inconsistent" verdicts limitation.
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effects. In Section VI, I present the results algebraically to explain the intuition
in yet another medium. Readers who find the notation of this Comment
cumbersome should be able to grasp the central themes without reading
Section VI.
I. The "Full and Fair Opportunity to Litigate" and the Abandonment
of Mutuality
Before 1971, under the rule of mutuality, federal courts only applied issue
preclusion in cases where both parties had litigated the prior suit. 6 The old
mutuality rule provided that, "[t]he [prior] determination was . . . not con-
clusive if the second action involved different parties, even though one of them
had been a party to the first action and had unsuccessfully litigated the issue
on that occasion."'17 Federal courts now permit non-mutual issue preclusion.
A party seeking issue preclusion must only show that in the previous action,
the party against whom it seeks to apply issue preclusion "received a 'full and
fair' opportunity to litigate [its] claims."' 8 Therefore, under non-mutual issue
preclusion, a defendant that litigates and loses may be precluded from arguing
its innocence against future plaintiffs. However, even if a defendant was a
party to a prior case, a new plaintiff who had not had an opportunity to liti-
gate the issue in the previous trial could not be precluded from arguing the
issue. 9
An example will serve to make this point clear. Assume that Drugco
manufactures -a product called Widgicillin. Widgicillin is useful in treating a
certain disease but may cause hair loss. On the packages of Widgicillin,
Drugco places a warning that states that the use of the product may cause hair
loss. However, this warning is in very fine print. Some who use Widgicillin do
indeed lose their hair. Assume that to establish tort liability, Widgicillin users
must establish both that Drugco's warning on the Widgicillin packaging was
insufficient and that Widgicillin caused their hair to fall out.
Alex and Brad use Widgicillin and subsequently lose their hair. Assume
that Alex sues before Brad and wins his suit. Under Parklane, Brad could cite
Alex's case to establish that Widgicillin's warning label was insufficient and
ask the court to preclude Drugco from arguing otherwise. If instead Alex had
lost and the tribunal had specifically determined that Widgicillin's warning
label was sufficient,"0 Drugco could not invoke issue preclusion against Brad
16. James, Hazard, and Leubsdorf, Civil Procedure 5 11.25 at 619-20 (cited in note
1). See also Bigelow v Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 US 111
(1912); Restatement of the Law of Judgments 5 93(b) (1942).
17. James, Hazard, and Leubsdorf, Civil Procedure 5 11.25 at 619-20 (cited in note
1). See also Restatement of Judgments 5 93(b) (1942).
18. Parklane, 439 US at 332-33.
19. See James, Hazard, and Leubsdorf, Civil Procedure 5 11.23 at 617-18 (cited in
note 1) ("As a general rule, a person's legal rights may not be concluded without an
opportunity to litigate them. The protection of this opportunity is a matter of due process
under the Constitution.").
20. In Section II of this Comment, I demonstrate why it is necessary to assume that
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since Brad had not had a chance to litigate the issue. The fact that Brad could
invoke issue preclusion against Drugco had Alex prevailed in the first suit
while Drugco could not invoke issue preclusion against Brad had Drugco pre-
vailed will be referred to as the asymmetry of offensive, non-mutual issue
preclusion.
Therefore, ignoring the Parklane limitations, if a defendant loses a suit in
which an issue is determinative, a court may use that judgment to preclude the
defendant from relitigating the issue in a suit brought by a subsequent plain-
tiff. The issue will be conclusively established against the defendant. However,
if the defendant wins, courts will not preclude future plaintiffs from litigating
the issue as they have not had a "full and fair opportunity to litigate."
II. Parklane's Limitations and the Lower Courts' Interpretations of
"Inconsistent" Verdicts
In Parklane, the Supreme Court advised lower courts against applying issue
preclusion based on a judgment that "is itself inconsistent with one or more
previous judgments in favor of the defendant."21 If tribunals specifically state
their reasoning, that is, they return specific verdicts,' courts can easily deter-
mine when verdicts are "inconsistent." A specific verdict will state the grounds
on which the tribunal decided the case and subsequent courts may determine
which issues were decided. Assume Alex's tribunal returned a specific verdict
stating that Drugco's warning was sufficient. The verdict for Brad is necessarily
inconsistent with a prior verdict and should not preclude Drugco from arguing
the sufficiency of the warning in Carl's suit.'
the tribunal specifically determined the sufficiency of the warning.
21. Parklane, 439 US at 330.
22. A specific verdict is defined as any verdict in which the tribunal states the specific
reasons for its judgment. Black's Law Dictionary at 1560 (cited in note 9). This would
include a bench trial in which a judge writes an opinion. Id. This would also include
special verdicts in which a jury states the facts which it found. Id. The court then applies
the law to the facts. Finally, this would include a general verdict with interrogatories in
which the jury returns a general verdict and answers "written interrogatories upon one or
more issues of fact the decision of which is necessary to a verdict." Id. See also FRCP
49(b).
23. This follows directly from Parklane. Parklane, 439 US at 330-31. For an example
of a case where the court refused to apply issue preclusion when the verdict to be relied
upon was inconsistent with a previous specific verdict, see Aloe Coal Co. v Clark
Equipment Co., 623 F Supp 88, 89 (W D Pa 1985) (refusing to apply issue preclusion
because certain conclusions regarding a product's defects were inconsistent with a jury's
negative response to a special interrogatory and with a specific finding by a judge);
Raynor v Ricbardson-Merrell, Inc., 643 F Supp 238, 242, 246 (D DC 1986) (refusing to
apply issue preclusion despite prior verdicts for plaintiffs because in separate actions, both
a judge and a jury specifically found for defendant on the relevant issue, causation); Miller
v A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 565 F Supp 24, 26 (S D Fla 1983) (refusing to apply issue
preclusion despite prior plaintiff's victories because defendant also obtained favorable
verdicts and a jury had returned a special interrogatory finding for the defendant on the
relevant issues).
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Unfortunately, the term "inconsistent" is ambiguous if the prior decisions
were in the form of general verdicts. That is because general verdicts do not
explain the tribunal's reasoning.24 Some courts have adopted a narrow
reading of "inconsistent" and only apply issue preclusion when prior verdicts
are necessarily inconsistent." Other courts have adopted a broader reading of
However, even a specific verdict for the defendant will not completely prevent the
future use of issue preclusion against the defendant. Courts applying offensive, non-mutual
issue preclusion despite arguably inconsistent verdicts have justified their decisions with
reasoning that seems applicable even in the case of a direct conflict between specific
verdicts. One court has stated that it would be inequitable to deny courts use of "modern
principles of collateral estoppel" simply because a defendant has prevailed in a "frivolous"
lawsuit. Mooney, 485 F Supp at 247-48. Read narrowly, this case suggests that when a
previous lawsuit was so frivolous as to not shake a court's confidence in the validity of
the determination against the defendant, the court may still apply issue preclusion. In
situations where a defendant's victory is followed by several plaintiff victories, this logic
may be highly persuasive. However, the situation in Mooney involved a defendant had
prevailed in several prior cases. Id at 247.
24. When a jury renders a general verdict, it simply finds for one of the parties.
Black's Law Dictionary at 1560 (cited in note 9). Unless accompanied by interrogatories,
a general verdict does not state specific findings of fact. Id. See also FRCP 49(b).
25. See, for example, Mooney, 485 F Supp at 246-48 (applying issue preclusion despite
"a dozen or so" verdicts for defendant because no case specifically held for defendant on
the relevant issue); Amader v Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 546 F Supp 1033, 1038-39 (E D
Pa 1982) (stating that general verdicts for defendant would not act as a bar to future
issue preclusion); Fraley v American Cyanamid Co., 570 F Supp 497, 503-04 (D Colo
1983) (applying issue preclusion despite defendant's prior victory because jury returned
general verdict. This was done even though the appellate court specifically upheld the rul-
ing, in part, on the issue in question.).
Parklane does not support the narrow reading of "inconsistent," which would forbid
issue preclusion only when the verdicts are necessarily inconsistent. Indeed, this narrow
reading would allow issue preclusion in the very scenario for which the Supreme Court
created the exception. The Supreme Court created the "inconsistent" verdicts limitation to
prevent an "unfair" application of offensive, non-mutual issue preclusion. Parklane, 439
US at 331. This unfairness stems from the asymmetry of non-mutual issue preclusion and
the potential for opportunistic behavior.
In creating this exception, the Supreme Court specifically cited a hypothetical
presented in an important article written by Professor Brainerd Currie. Id at 330-31 (citing
Brainerd Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel. Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 Stan
L Rev 281, 304 (1957)). Professor Currie posited a train wreck in which fifty people were
injured. Professor Currie asked rhetorically whether a court should apply issue preclusion
against the defendant based on a verdict for one of the train wreck victims if there had
been twenty-five previous verdicts for the defendant. Currie, 9 Stan L Rev at 286. If the
railroad did not obtain a specific verdict in the first twenty-five cases, the railroad could
not show that a tribunal had necessarily determined that it had not been negligent. The
tribunal may have found that the train wreck did not cause the plaintiffs' injuries or that
the plaintiffs were simply not injured. If the twenty-sixth court found in favor of the
plaintiff, the twenty-seventh court could invoke issue preclusion against the railroad by
reasoning that the verdict for the twenty-sixth plaintiff was not necessarily inconsistent
with the prior verdicts for the defendant.
While this result seems surprising, at least one court has found that issue preclusion
is appropriate despite "a dozen or so" defendant's victories. Mooney, 485 F Supp at 247-
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"inconsistent" and require only that prior verdicts for the defendant undermine
the court's confidence in the verdict for the plaintiff.2
Assume that Alex, Brad, and Carl sue Drugco. Alex's tribunal returns a
general verdict for Drugco and Brad's tribunal returns a verdict for Brad. Carl
asks the court to preclude Drugco from arguing that its warning was sufficient.
Carl's court knows that Brad won his suit against Drugco, and therefore Brad
must have proven both elements of his case, including the fact that Drugco's
warning was insufficient. Carl's court also knows that Alex lost his suit against
Drugco, but it does not know whether Alex's court determined that Drugco's
warning was sufficient. Alex's court may have rejected the claim against
Drugco either because the warning was sufficient or because Alex lost his hair
due to other causes. Either determination would have been sufficient to return
a verdict for Drugco. Thus, the decision for Drugco and the decision for Brad
are not necessarily inconsistent. Both courts may have agreed that Drugco's
warning was not sufficient, but Alex's court may have found that Alex lost his
hair due to natural causes. Alternatively, the cases may be inconsistent. Alex's
court may have denied recovery because it determined that the warning was
sufficient, while Brad's court must have found that the warning was insuffi-
cient. Knowing only that one court found for Drugco and that another found
for a plaintiff, Carl's court cannot know whether the courts agreed that
Drugco's warning was sufficient. Under the narrow reading of "inconsistent"
48. The Mooney court noted that of the two thousand asbestos cases filed, "only a dozen
or so" had reached a final judgment in favor of the defendant. Id at 247. As the Mooney
court bases issue preclusion on only one decision for a plaintiff, it is assumed that the
other cases either settled or had not reached final judgment. Perhaps the defendant was
selectively going to trial against unsympathetic plaintiffs or incompetent attorneys in order
to establish a record that would prevent future issue preclusion.
26. See, for example, Hardy v Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F2d 334, 343 (5th Cir
1982) (asbestos case in which court held that previous general verdicts in favor of the
defendant prevented application of issue preclusion because the issues decided were
"ultimately ambiguous as to certain key issues"); Vogt v Emerson Elec Co., 805 F Supp
506, 510 (M D Tenn 1992) (products liability case in which court refused to apply issue
preclusion to benefit plaintiff where defendant had prevailed in twenty of twenty-four
similar cases that had gone to trial); Hoppe v G. D. Searle & Co., 779 F Supp 1425,
1427 (S D NY 1991) (products liability case in which court refused to apply issue preclu-
sion because defendant had prevailed in sixteen of twenty cases that had gone to trial);
Lavetter v Intl Playtex, 706 F Supp 722, 723 (D Ariz 1988) (products liability case in
which court refused to apply issue preclusion as defendant had prevailed in five of six
cases to go to trial); Harrison v Celotex Corp., 583 F Supp 1497 (E D Tenn 1984)
(asbestos case in which court refused to apply issue preclusion as defendant had prevailed
in thirty-five similar lawsuits, or about half of the cases that went to trial); see also Jack
Faucett Associates v AT&T, 744 F2d 118 (DC Cir 1984). Jack Faucett Associates involves
a slightly different issue. Judge Mikva held that issue preclusion should not be based on
a verdict that is inconsistent with a prior determination by another tribunal even though
the previous determination was not part of a final judgment. Id at 129-32. However, his
requirement that "[t]he only requirement is that the inconsistent determination undermines
the court's confidence in the correctness of the prior decision" is applicable here. Id at
130.
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verdicts, Carl's court might preclude Drugco from arguing that its warning was
sufficient, since the prior verdicts are not necessarily inconsistent. Under the
broader reading, Carl's court might permit Drugco to argue that its warning
was sufficient, since the prior verdict for Drugco undermines the court's
confidence in the prior verdict for a plaintiff. Drugco would have an even
stronger argument against issue preclusion if it had prevailed in multiple suits
involving its warning label, since at least one of the tribunals would likely
have determined that Drugco's warning label was sufficient.
27
III. The Model
Because the overwhelming majority of disputes are settled privately before
the court reaches final judgment,28 I will focus on the effect issue preclusion
has on settlement.
I employ a model based on one presented in the Harvard Law Review.29
The model presented in the Harvard Law Review was based on the Polinsky-
Shavell settlement model.3" The Polinsky-Shavell settlement model was created
to predict when rational actors will settle rather than litigate, and to predict
the range of values within which they will settle.31 Like the Polinsky-Shavell
model, my model assumes that when there is a potential for mutual gain from
settlement, the parties will settle. That is, when a defendant expects total losses
from litigation to exceed what the plaintiff expects to gain from litigation, the
parties will settle.3" The model in the Harvard Law Review was created to
examine settlement in the presence of issue preclusion.33 I have adopted this
model's notation wherever possible. The primary distinctions between the
model found in this Comment and that found in the Harvard Law Review are
that this Comment's model examines the possibility that a verdict for a
defendant may reduce the possibility of future issue preclusion and that the
model in this Comment makes explicit assumptions about parties' expectations
27. Significantly, in all cases I examined in which the court determined that the
plaintiff's verdict was inconsistent with one or more general verdicts for the defendant, the
defendant had prevailed in multiple suits. See cases discussed in note 26. I was unable to
find a case in which a single prior general verdict for the defendant prevented a court
from applying issue preclusion.
28. David M. Trubek, et al, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L Rev 72,
85-89 (1983). According to this study, only 11.2 percent of disputes are ever filed and,
of these, only 8 percent ever reach trial. Id at 87, 89.
29. Note, 105 Harv L Rev 1940 (cited in note 14).
30. A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 107-18 (Little,
Brown, 2d ed 1989); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis
under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J Legal Stud 55 (1982).
As variants of this model are common in the literature, not all the assumptions of the
model will be repeated here.
31. Polinsky, Law and Economics at 107-18 (cited in note 30); Shavell, 11 J Legal
Stud 55 (cited in note 30).
32. This includes litigation costs for both parties.
33. Note, 105 Harv L Rev at 1952-56 (cited in note 14).
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of future settlement.
I assume that parties are risk neutral and that they will only consider
expected liability" and litigation expenses. I also assume that plaintiffs cannot
alter the order in which they sue or settles" and that they are ordered ac-
cording to when they filed suit.16 No two plaintiffs will settle at the same
time. I make some allowance for the possibility that new plaintiffs will appear
and file. M.,k is the probability that at least k more plaintiffs will file given
that n plaintiffs have already filed. For simplicity, I assume that if another
plaintiff will file, he will file in the next period; the time between filings is
uniform.37 Future costs will be discounted by 8.
I examine both the case of a known number of plaintiffs and the case of
an unknown number of plaintiffs. N represents the total number of potential
plaintiffs. If the number of plaintiffs is known, the plaintiffs will simply be
numbered from one to N. M,k will equal one for k<N+l-n and otherwise it
will equal zero. In the case of an unknown number of plaintiffs, N is infinite.
I assume that there is only one issue at trial and that all plaintiffs share
this issue. I further assume that there is only one stage of litigation-trial. The
probability that plaintiff n will win at trial is denoted as Pn; the probability
that plaintiff n+1 will win is denoted as P,,1. I assume that the amount of
damages suffered by the current plaintiff is common knowledge between that
plaintiff, the defendant, and the court. Damages for the nth plaintiff are
denoted as W,. The litigation costs of one trial for each party are denoted as
C.
Neither party knows the probability of winning at trial or the damages a
particular future plaintiff will receive. However, both parties know the distri-
bution from which those plaintiffs will be drawn and thus have identical ex-
pectations of future parties' characteristics. Prior suits expose information and
so affect the plaintiffs' probabilities of victory. If, however, parties settle, there
is no trial and possibly no discovery. As it is difficult to assess the direction of
this information effect, parties will assume that the information will not affect
the probability that future plaintiffs will win. Therefore, the expected probabil-
ity of victory and a particular plaintiff's expected damages are not affected by
the plaintiff's position in line.38 That is, E(Pl,k)=P and E(W,,k)=W.
34. In simplified form, expected liability is a function of each party's probability
of victory and the damages suffered by each party.
35. This assumption is made to avoid the necessity of an equilibrium condition.
In truth, plaintiffs can at least affect the time at which they settle. Furthermore, delaying
the time of filing does not seem to affect "a plaintiff's ability to invoke issue preclusion,
except in the most egregious cases. See Jack Ratliff, Offensive Collateral Estoppel and the
Option Effect, 67 Tex L Rev 63, 87 (1988). Some of the consequences of such a condi-
tion are discussed in Section IV C.
36. The reader interested in comparing my results to those found in Note, 105
Harv L Rev at 1946 (cited in note 14), should note that the notation is different. My
notation allows for a single model to express both the case of a known number of
plaintiffs and a stylized model of an uncertain number of plaintiffs.
37. Therefore, M,4 = M,, * MK,,k.j.
38. I will show that plaintiffs with a high relative probability of victory are better
1995]
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A defendant's total expected liability depends on whether a victory could
effectively immunize her from future issue preclusion. 39As the discussion of
the meaning of "inconsistent" in Section II suggests, the answer to this ques-
tion is unclear. Courts disagree about the meaning of "inconsistent," particu-
larly when the defendant has won general verdicts. A generalized model
providing that a defendant's victory will reduce, but not eliminate, the chance
of future issue preclusion would best match reality. However, I will only
compare the extremes. Either a defendant's victory will act as a completely
effective vaccine against future issue preclusion or a defendant's victory will
not protect the defendant from issue preclusion at all.4" By comparing the
extremes, I will show the effects of the courts' interpretations, particularly in
the presence of judicial bias.
The "vaccine" (V) case, in which a defendant's victory forecloses future
issue preclusion, may be thought of as a regime in which courts routinely
return specific verdicts and in which courts interpret "inconsistent" verdicts
broadly. The "ineffective" (I) case may be thought of as a regime in which
courts almost never return specific verdicts and in which courts interpret
"inconsistent" verdicts narrowly.
A defendant's willingness to settle depends on the consequences of going
to trial now and on what the defendant expects to happen if she settles.
Therefore, a defendant's expectation of the likelihood of future settlement is
critical. A rational defendant would assume that some fraction of future cases
will settle, but for ease of exposition, I will only compare the extremes. The
defendant will either assume that all future cases will go to trial (T) or that all
future cases will settle (S). All plaintiffs will share the defendant's belief.
The defendant's expected liability if she goes to trial against the nth
plaintiff is denoted as Xij, with i equal to V or I and j equal to T or S. The
expected liability from trial, like most variables, depends on the present and
future courts' interpretations of "inconsistent" and the parties' expectation of
the likelihood of future settlement.
The reservation settlement prices of the defendant and the nth plaintiff are
denoted as Rijd and Rijp, with i again equal to I or V and j equal to T or S.
off if they file early. If plaintiffs can affect the order in which they sue, one might expect
early plaintiffs to have relatively higher probabilities of victory than later plaintiffs. Such
an assumption may yield an interesting equilibrium question. I will simply assume that
strategic delays will result in the denial of issue preclusion. Plaintiffs will simply sue when
they are harmed.
39. One commentator assumed implicitly that courts would apply issue preclusion
regardless of whether the verdict upon which the issue preclusion was to be based was
itself inconsistent with previous judgments. This assumption is implicit in the derivation of
the commentator's equations. Note, 105 Harv L Rev at 1947-48 (cited in note 14). The
commentator justified this assumption by citing to the decision in Mooney, 485 F Supp
242. Id at 1941 n 11.
40. This may seem odd as there is only one issue at trial. Verdicts for plaintiff and
defendant must, by definition, be inconsistent. The assumption of a single issue greatly
simplifies the model but still conveys the central message.
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That is, a defendant would be willing to settle for any amount below Rijd, and
the nth plaintiff would be willing to settle for any amount above Rijp,. The
expected settlement in the nth suit is denoted as Eij°.
Finally, the defendant's expected total liability to future plaintiffs when she
faces plaintiff n is denoted as Ln. Note that
As some convention is needed for settlement value, I assume that parties
expect to divide the settlement range in half. That is, if the plaintiff may
invoke issue preclusion, the settlement will be for the total damages. If the
N-n
[1] Li =E M nkSEijl, .
k.o
defendant has been "immunized" through a previous victory, settlement will be
for expected damages.4 If the defendant expects future disputes to settle, her
reservation value is given by RiSdn=XiSn-M,,SLiSn,1, the defendant's expected
total liability if she goes to trial this period minus her expected total liability
if she settles this period. If the defendant expects future cases to go to trial,
the maximum settlement is given by RiT.=XiTn-M.,,8XiTn,, the defenlant's
expected total liability if she goes to trial this period minus her expected total
liability if she goes to trial next period discounted by the probability that
another plaintiff will sue.
This defendant's reservation value is averaged with the plaintiff's reserva-
tion value, expected damages minus litigation costs, to get the expected
settlement.
IV. Explanation of the Results
In this section, I discuss the effect that offensive, non-mutual issue preclu-
sion has on expected liability and settlement values. I then discuss how the
effects of judicial bias are enhanced if courts interpret "inconsistent" verdicts
in such a way that a verdict for a defendant substantially reduces the possibili-
ty that the defendant will ever be subject to issue preclusion. Next, I discuss
the consequences of relaxing the assumption that plaintiffs cannot alter the
time at which they settle. In my discussion of the consequences of relaxing this
assumption, I intend merely to alert the reader to the limitations of the
Comment's analysis, especially as it relates to the comparison between early
and late plaintiffs. These limitations notwithstanding, I then offer a brief com-
parison of early and late plaintiffs.
41. This result, as well as the settlement value in a case where the court will apply
issue preclusion, follows directly from the assumption that plaintiffs and defendants have
identical litigation costs and that parties will split the settlement range.
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A. EXPECTED LIABILITY
Regardless of whether parties expect future cases to settle and regardless of
how courts interpret the "inconsistent ' 42 verdicts limitation, offensive, non-
mutual issue preclusion increases a defendant's expected liability. However, to
the extent that courts interpret the "inconsistent" verdicts limitation in such a
way that a verdict for the defendant acts as an effective vaccine against future
issue preclusion, the increase in liability that is due to offensive, non-mutual issue
preclusion is decreased. Still, the defendant's expected liability is greater than it
would be if courts did not apply offensive, non-mutual issue preclusion. This
comparison is significant. If there is no offensive, non-mutual issue preclusion, a
plaintiff's settlement will depend solely on the merits of his case. That is, the
plaintiff will not receive a settlement enhanced or reduced by the characteristics
of the other plaintiffs.
In deciding whether to settle, the defendant must compare the consequences
of trial to the consequences of settlement. Under offensive, non-mutual issue
preclusion, a judgment could potentially result in future courts taking an issue as
conclusively established against the defendant. As issue preclusion will not be
based on a settlement, the defendant is willing to offer a greater settlement than
he would be if there were no offensive, non-mutual issue preclusion.
If the courts interpret the "inconsistent" verdicts limitation broadly, or
return specific verdicts, a verdict for the defendant may immunize the defendant
from issue preclusion and reduce her expected liability. The defendant's willing-
ness to settle would then not only reflect the risk of losing and enabling future
plaintiffs to establish issue preclusion, but also reflect the chance of winning and
settling with those plaintiffs for a value that does not reflect the threat of issue
preclusion. The defendant may actually gain from a given trial. Since she will
reduce the value of future settlements if she wins, she is no longer willing to offer
as large a settlement as she would if a verdict in her favor did not reduce the risk
of future issue preclusion.
Even with the "inconsistent" verdicts limitation, a defendant's expected
liability under offensive, non-mutual issue preclusion is greater than it would be
if offensive, non-mutual issue preclusion were not permitted. A defendant's
victory can only result in immunization from future issue preclusion; future
plaintiffs cannot be precluded from litigating the issue as they have not had a
"full and fair opportunity to litigate." Therefore, even if courts interpret "incon-
sistent" verdicts broadly, the defendant's expected total liability will still be
greater than if the courts maintained the mutuality requirement.
The extra settlement that the defendant must offer the plaintiff because of
the threat of future issue preclusion will be called the plaintiff's "issue preclusion
bonus." An issue preclusion bonus is defined as the difference between a given
plaintiff's expected settlement under offensive, non-mutual issue preclusion and
42. This assumes, of course, that no court has already decided a case.
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his expected settlement in the absence of issue preclusion.
Whether or not parties expect future cases to go to trial or to settle will
greatly affect the size of the issue preclusion bonus. To the extent that the
defendant expects future cases to settle rather than go to trial, she is willing to
offer a larger issue preclusion bonus. If a defendant expects future cases to go to
trial, settling will only postpone the trial for one period. If she expects future
cases to settle, settling now will mean that the defendant will never risk issue
preclusion. Although the defendant will have to pay issue preclusion bonuses to
the future plaintiffs, these bonuses do not include the full cost of the risk of issue
preclusion as the plaintiff and defendant split the difference between their
reservation settlement values. Therefore, the defendant will be willing to offer a
larger settlement to each plaintiff if she expects future cases to settle. Conse-
quently, if the defendant assumes that future cases will settle, her expected
liability is greater than her actual liability if she assumes future cases will go to
trial but the future cases do in fact settle.
B. EFFECT OF JUDICIAL BIAS
If a defendant's victory protects against future issue preclusion, bias in our
legal system becomes even more important. If a plaintiff is "attractive," with a
relatively high probability of winning, issue preclusion may dramatically increase
his settlement. If a plaintiff is "unattractive," with a relatively low probability of
winning, issue preclusion may reduce the settlement. A plaintiff's probability of
prevailing on a common issue may diverge for two primary reasons. Plaintiffs
who hire better lawyers are more likely to win, and plaintiffs who better evoke
the juries' or judges' sympathy are more likely to win.
The reason why judicial bias greatly affects settlement values when, a
defendant's victory acts as an effective vaccine is best understood by focusing on
the defendant's incentives. If Drugco goes to trial, it may lose and future courts
will treat the insufficiency of the label as conclusively established in all future liti-
gation. However, if Drugco wins the suit, it may substantially reduce the chance
that future courts will base issue preclusion on a subsequent verdict for a
plaintiff. Because the risk of future issue preclusion is substantially reduced,
Drugco will not have to offer as large settlements in the future. Thus, the issue
preclusion bonuses, which reflect the risk of future issue preclusion, will be
reduced.
Obviously, the higher the plaintiff's relative probability of victory, the less
attractive litigation appears to the defendant. With an attractive plaintiff, there
is a greater chance that the defendant will have an issue conclusively established
against her in future litigation and less of a chance that the defendant will be
able to avoid paying "issue preclusion bonuses" to future plaintiffs.
Although Drugco cannot affect whether or when a plaintiff will sue, it can,
by varying its settlement offers, affect whether or not that plaintiff will go to
trial. Essentially, the defendant will have a strong incentive to "shop" for a
relatively unattractive plaintiff by settling with relatively attractive plaintiffs. The
more attractive the plaintiff is, the more the defendant will offer to avoid the
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possibility of trial. However, a defendant will offer very little to a relatively
unattractive plaintiff because trial, and the possibility of avoiding the payment of
future issue preclusion bonuses, may appear very desirable to the defendant. In
fact, the defendant's reservation settlement offer may be below the plaintiff's
expected return from trial, and, therefore, trial would be inevitable.
If justice is not blind, and a defendant's victory can substantially immunize
the defendant against future issue preclusion, the defendant will have an incen-
tive to "shop" for unattractive plaintiffs. The defendant will settle with attractive
plaintiffs in an effort to litigate only against unattractive plaintiffs. The result of
the defendant's "shopping" is that "attractive" plaintiffs receive an enhanced
settlement while "unattractive" plaintiffs receive reduced settlements or are
forced to go to trial and incur litigation costs.
C. EFFECTS OF ALLOWING PLAINTIFFS TO ALTER THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY
SUE
Commentators have claimed that offensive, non-mutual issue preclusion will
cause plaintiffs to strategically alter the time at which they sue. However, these
commentators have disagreed with regard to whether plaintiffs will wish to wait
for other plaintiffs to file first43 or rush to file." As I explicitly assume that
plaintiffs cannot alter the order in which they sue, I do not directly address this
question.4"
To correctly determine whether plaintiffs would wish to file early or late, one
would need to consider the settlements in equilibrium. I did not uncover such an
approach in the literature. Although a full treatment of this question is left for
further research, an example will demonstrate that the ability of plaintiffs to alter
the order in which they sue can dramatically affect settlement and the implica-
tions of offensive, non-mutual issue preclusion.
If the defendant faces a known number of homogeneous plaintiffs who can
costlessly alter the order in which they sue, offensive, non-mutual issue preclu-
sion will have no effect on the defendant's expected liability. In equilibrium, no
plaintiff can have an incentive to alter the time at which he sues. Therefore, all
plaintiffs must receive the same settlement. However, one plaintiff must sue last.
As there are no future plaintiffs, this plaintiff must receive the expected value of
his judgment. All other plaintiffs can only receive as much as the last plaintiff;
therefore each plaintiff must receive the expected value of his judgment. Essen-
tially, all plaintiffs compete to be the first to settle. In doing so, they accept
lower and lower offers from the defendant until the defendant pays each plaintiff
his expected judgment.
43. See, for example, Ratliff, 67 Tex L Rev at 77 (cited in note 35) (noting that a
prospective plaintiff "can stand outside the initial litigation and benefit from chance errors
in his favor without taking the risk of chance errors against him (or his surrogate)"). See
also Parklane, 439 US at 329 (suggesting plaintiffs may adopt a "'wait and see' attitude").
44. Note, 105 Harv L Rev 1940 (cited in note 14).
45. See note 35 and accompanying text.
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My conclusions depend on the assumption that plaintiffs cannot alter the
order in which they sue. If plaintiffs could change the order in which they sue,
the results could be quite different. While I do not attempt a thorough analysis
of this issue, such an assumption may imply much smaller settlement values as
plaintiffs "compete" for the optimal place in line.
D. EARLY VERSUS LATE PLAINTIFFS
Some tentative comparisons between plaintiffs who file early and those who
file late can be made. In the absence of judicial bias, early plaintiffs generally
receive higher settlements than late plaintiffs." However, this assumes that all
previous plaintiffs have settled. Whether or not early plaintiffs receive a higher
return than late plaintiffs depends on the probability that disputes settle. By
waiting, a plaintiff reduces her expected settlement if all previous plaintiffs
settle. Therefore, if all other cases will settle, the plaintiff is better off if he sues
early.
46. While early plaintiffs generally receive more than late plaintiffs, the difference in
settlements between two early plaintiffs is far less than the difference in settlements
between two later plaintiffs. That is, the benefit from filing ahead of one person decreases
for remaining plaintiffs. This is true regardless of how courts interpret "inconsistent" and
regardless of whether parties expect future cases to settle or go to trial. Settlement values
are clearly bounded above by some amount. This amount depends on the courts' inter-
pretation of "inconsistent" and the parties future expectations. Settlement values generally
approach this value fairly quickly.
If a defendant's victory is completely effective at preventing future issue preclusion
and parties expect all future cases to go to trial, the result is dramatic. If the number of
remaining plaintiffs is known, all settlement values, except the value for the last plaintiff,
will be the same. A single verdict will conclusively decide whether or not the plaintiff can
invoke issue preclusion. Since parties expect all cases to go to trial, a decision to settle
will only postpone this determination one period. Therefore, the only relevant values are
those of the next plaintiff. Since plaintiff's probability of victory and damages are assumed
to be the same no matter the order in which the plaintiffs sue, all settlement values will
be the same except for the last plaintiff who, by definition, is not followed by another
plaintiff.
Even if a defendant's victory does not act as a complete bar against future issue
preclusion, the settlement value reaches an upper bound. This stems from the virtual
impossibility of the defendant winning a large number of independent determinations. If
a defendant would win 80 percent of the time a case is tried before a jury, and if this
percentage is independent of the number of times the suit is tried, the defendant has less
than a 7 percent chance of winning twelve suits and less than 0.4 percent chance of
winning twenty-five suits. If there is a large number of plaintiffs, the defendant will expect
to lose before all plaintiffs have sued. By settling with the current plaintiff, the defendant
merely shifts her expectations back one period.
When parties expect settlement, a limit is reached as the plaintiffs begin to extract
the entire gain from settlement. Although each plaintiff only extracts half of the gain from
the defendant, earlier plaintiffs will realize that the defendant will anticipate this gain if
she settles. The plaintiff will therefore extract some of this gain from settlement. For any
given plaintiff, the further in the future another plaintiff is, the more plaintiffs are ex-
tracting gain from the settlement gap and the less there is to extract. See equation [11a].
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However, if a plaintiff expects suits to go to trial, he will expect to receive
a greater return if he files late. A plaintiff receives a higher return by filing after
a plaintiff who will go to trial than by filing before that plaintiff. This is true
whether or not a defendant's victory will prevent future issue preclusion. If the
litigating plaintiff loses, the current plaintiff may lose his issue preclusion bonus.
Even if a defendant's victory is ineffective at preventing issue preclusion, the
defendant's settlement will have decreased as there are fewer remaining plaintiffs.
However, this loss is more than offset by the possibility of invoking issue preclu-
sion should the prior plaintiff win.47
Judicial bias makes the order in which the plaintiffs sue more important.
Attractive plaintiffs who file early receive a greater settlement than those attrac-
tive plaintiffs who file late. Conversely, unattractive plaintiffs who file early
receive a smaller settlement than those unattractive plaintiffs who file late. The
effects of issue preclusion are enhanced by the number of remaining plaintiffs.
Obviously both the threat that one will be liable to all future plaintiffs and the
benefit from avoiding the payment of issue preclusion bonuses to all future
plaintiffs are greater if there are more future plaintiffs. As the threat of future
issue preclusion outweighs the benefit of avoiding the payment of issue preclu-
sion bonuses when the plaintiff is relatively attractive, the defendant is willing to
offer the attractive plaintiff a greater settlement if that plaintiff sues early. For
similar reasons, the defendant is willing to offer the unattractive plaintiff a
greater settlement if that plaintiff sues late.
V. Numerical Example
Assume that one hundred plaintiffs48 will claim that Drugco is liable for
their hair loss. Assume that all plaintiffs can easily show that Widgicillin proxi-
mately caused their hair loss and that the only remaining issue in all cases is
whether the warning was sufficient. Assume, for simplicity, that future settlement
values are not discounted and that, despite parties' expectations, all cases will
settle.
Initially consider the case in which justice is blind. Assume that all plaintiffs
have a 20 percent chance of winning a $1,000 judgment against Drugco. Addi-
tionally, assume that each party's litigation costs are $100 each time a dispute
goes to trial.49 As a basis of comparison, if courts still required mutuality to
47. To the extent that a defendant's victory is "ineffective," this result stems from the
fact that settlement values are bounded. See note 46 and figure 1. If a defendant's victory
is an effective "vaccine," this result also depends on the fact that the defendant and
plaintiff split the settlement range. No general proofs of these propositions are given.
However, the effect is demonstrated in Section V.
48. Such a large number is chosen to examine the effect of large numbers and the
limiting tendency of settlement values. The small number example can be analyzed by
examining the last few plaintiffs. The ninety-fifth plaintiff in this model is in an identical
position as if he were the first of six plaintiffs to sue.
49. While this assumption affects the maximum settlement, it does not affect the
expected settlement as the plaintiff will also incur these costs if the parties require a
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apply issue preclusion, Drugco would settle for no more than $300 and the
expected settlement would be $200.
A. EXPECTED LIABILITY
Table 1 models settlement values for homogeneous plaintiffs as a function of
their place in line. Regardless of the court's interpretation of "inconsistent"
verdicts and the parties' expectations of the likelihood of settlement, the last
plaintiff's settlement value is identical to that in the case where the court refuses
to apply issue preclusion. As there are no future plaintiffs, there is no threat of
future issue preclusion. Furthermore, all other plaintiffs settle for more than they
would have in the absence of issue preclusion because the settlement includes an
issue preclusion bonus. Finally, the settlement value of the second-to-last plaintiff
is invariant to the regime chosen. For the regime to matter, there must be a
possibility that a plaintiff will seek issue preclusion based on inconsistent
verdicts. Therefore, there must be at least two more plaintiffs.
Table I
Settlement with a Known Number of Homogeneous Plaintiffs
When P=0.2 and W=$1,000
Plaintiff RIT RIS RVT RVS EIT EIS EVT EVS
1 $1,100 $1,900 $460 $620 $600 $1,000 $280 $360
10 $1,100 $1,900 $460 $620 $600 $1,000 $280 $360
20 $1,100 $1,900 $460 $620 $600 $1,000 $280 $360
30 $1,100 $1,899 $460 $620 $600 $999 $280 $360
40 $1,100 $1,897 $460 $620 $600 $999 $280 $360
50 $1,100 $1,892 $460 $620 $600 $996 $280 $360
60 $1,100 $1,876 $460 $620 $600 $988 $280 $360
70 $1,099 $1,832 $460 $620 $600 $966 $280 $360
80 $1,091 $1,705 $460 $620 $595 $903 $280 $360
85 $1,072 $1,571 $460 $620 $586 $835 $280 $360
90 $1,014 $1,342 $460 $620 $557 $721 $280 $360
91 $993 $1,280 $460 $619 $546 $690 $280 $360
92 $966 $1,211 $460 $619 $533 $656 $280 $359
93 $932 $1,135 $460 $618 $516 $617 $280 $359
94 $890 $1,050 $460 $615 $495 $575 $280 $358
95 $838 $955 $460 $610 $469 $528 $280 $355
96 $772 $850 $460 $600 $436 $475 $280 $350
97 $690 $734 $460, $580 $395 $417 $280 $340
98 $588 $604 $460 $540 $344 $352 $280 $320
99 $460 $460 $460 $460 $280 $280 $280 $280
100 $300 $300 $300 $300 $200 $200 $200 $200
In situations with inconsistent verdicts, if the parties expect courts to impose
issue preclusion despite a defendant's victory in a prior case, the defendant's
expected liability is significantly higher. Indeed, if parties expect future cases to
go to trial, and expect courts to impose issue preclusion despite the defendant's
victory in a prior case (I), a plaintiff with five plaintiffs remaining has an
expected settlement value over 67 percent higher than in a regime in which the
judgrment to settle their dispute.
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victory effectively vaccinates the defendant (V). If the parties expect future
disputes to settle, the relevant difference is over 48 percent. With ten plaintiffs
remaining, the relevant differences are approximately 99 percent and 100 percent
respectively. For the first plaintiff, the relevant differences are 214 percent and
278 percent.
The expectation of future settlement also increases each plaintiff's settlement.
If a defendant's victory operates as an effective "vaccine" in later cases, the
expectation of settlement will increase the ninety-fifth plaintiff's expected
settlement by approximately 27 percent and that of the first plaintiff by 29
percent. If the court will apply issue preclusion despite a defendant's prior
victory, the relevant numbers are approximately 13 percent and 67 percent.
Figure 1 demonstrates that early plaintiffs have similar settlement values.
While the settlement values continue to increase in the number of remaining
plaintiffs, except for case (VT), the increase quickly becomes rather small. In all
cases, a plaintiff with only twenty remaining plaintiffs will be able to extract a
settlement that is within 10 percent of what any plaintiff can extract. If a
defendant's victory insures immunity, the effect is more dramatic. If parties
expect all future cases to settle, a plaintiff who is to be followed by only six oth-
er plaintiffs will be within 10 percent of the highest possible settlement. If all
future cases are expected to go to trial, the settlement value is the same for all
but the last plaintiff.
1000
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400-
300 -
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Fig.1. Expected settlement value as a function of
plaintiff's place in line. All plaintiffs have a prob-
ability of winning at trial of 0.2 with damages of
$1,000.
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B. EFFECT OF JUDICIAL BIAs
Table 2 illustrates the consequences of justice that is less than blind. 0
Assume that Alex and Adam are both famous actors. Alex has been typecast as
a villain and consequently would only have a 19.7 percent chance of prevailing
at trial. Conversely, Adam is one of Hollywood's most beloved leading men and
would have a 20.3 percent chance of prevailing at trial. If a victory by Drugco
would immunize them against future issue preclusion, Drugco would strongly
prefer to see Alex as the first plaintiff rather than Adam. If parties expect future
cases to go to trial, Alex will only expect to settle for about $158, approximately
43.5 percent of what he would have settled for had all other plaintiffs also had
a 19.7 percent chance of winning. In fact, this is below the $197 he would have
settled for had there been no issue preclusion. If parties expect future cases to
settle, Alex should expect to settle for $238. While this value is more than he
would settle for without issue preclusion, it is still 33.8 percent less than he
would have received if all plaintiffs shared his low probability of victory. If Alex
had only a 19.5 percent chance of victory, and parties expected future cases to
go to trial, he would not be able to settle at all as Drugco would wish to take its
chances with him and possibly avoid paying future "issue preclusion bonuses."
If it is Adam, not Alex, who is harmed by Widgicillin, and Adam sues first,
Drugco will have to pay much more. Adam can expect to settle for almost $402
if parties expect future cases to go to trial. This is a 42 percent increase over
what he would receive if all other plaintiffs also had a 20.3 percent chance of
victory. If parties expect future cases to settle, Adam should expect to settle for
about $482, a 32 percent bonus over what he would have received if all plain-
tiffs were as attractive as he.
Although a plaintiff's probability of victory remains important, its value
relative to that of the other plaintiffs declines in importance as the number of
remaining plaintiffs decreases. Assume that rather than suing first, one of our
stars sues with only five remaining plaintiffs. Alex would expect to settle for
$271 if the parties expected future cases to go to trial, 1.8 percent less than he
would if all plaintiffs shared his low probability of victory. Adam would expect
to settle for $289, 1.8 percent more than he would if all plaintiffs shared his high
probability of victory. If parties expected future cases to settle, Alex would settle
for $346, a 1.2 percent discount due to his relatively low probability of victory.
Adam would settle for $364, a 1.2 percent bonus.
50. I present the values for the first plaintiff because the values are otherwise very
close to their limits. The ninety-fifth plaintiff is chosen to represent the situation in which
there are a small number of suits. The ninety-fifth plaintiff is equivalent to the first
plaintiff when six plaintiffs will sue in the future. Comparing the settlement values of these
two plaintiffs under the various assumptions reveals that the effects of judicial bias are
increasingly important as the number of remaining plaintiffs rises.
1995]
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C. EARLY VERSUS LATE PLAINTIFFS
Obviously Alex, the villain, is better off if he is the ninety-fifth plaintiff
rather than the first plaintiff. He will settle for $113 more by suing later if
parties expect future cases to go to trial and for $108 more if parties expect
future cases to settle. Adam, the hero, is better off by filing first. He will settle
for $75 more if parties expect trials and for $118 more if parties expect settle-
ments. This illustrates the hypothesis that as long as plaintiffs cannot alter the
order in which they sue, a relatively attractive plaintiff is better off if he files
early while a relatively unattractive plaintiff is better off if he files late.
As can be seen from table 2, heterogeneity has a much smaller impact if a
single plaintiff's victory does not act as an effective vaccine. There is little value
in repeating those numbers here.
If plaintiffs are homogeneous, whether a plaintiff is better off if he files early
depends on the probability that cases will go to trial. The plaintiff receives a
higher return by filing early if all cases will settle. If all cases other than the
plaintiff's own case are likely to go to trial, the plaintiff is better off if he files
late. This holds true for all cases. If a defendant's victory acts as an effective
vaccine, a plaintiff will expect a return of $360 if another plaintiff goes to trial
before he sues."' This exceeds any settlement possible under this scenario. If a
defendant's victory is ineffective (I), a victory by a defendant will not prevent
future plaintiffs from receiving issue preclusion bonuses. While the value of the
issue preclusion bonus has decreased due to the decline in the number of re-
maining plaintiffs, this is more than offset by the possibility of invoking issue
preclusion based on the prior plaintiff's victory. For example, the ninety-eighth
plaintiff can expect to settle for $64 more than the ninety-ninth plaintiff in
scenario (IT). However, if the ninety-eighth plaintiff goes to trial, the ninety-
ninth plaintiff can expect a return of $424,s2 $80 more than if he were the
ninety-eighth plaintiff.
VI. Algebraic Results
The plaintiff's reservation settlement value, Rijpn, does not depend on the
rules of issue preclusion or the expectations of future settlement. The value is
given by
[2] Rijp=F W-C.
One commentator derived the algebraic results for a regime in which courts
51. The first plaintiff will prevail 20 percent of the time. Even if that plaintiff does
not prevail, the current plaintiff will still have a 20 percent chance of prevailing. The
expected return is therefore (0.2 + 0.8 * 0.2) * $1,000 = $360.
52. 0.8 * $280 + 0.2 * $1,000. This analysis is equally valid when the parties expect
future cases to settle, however the extra return is only $72 ($424 - $352).
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always impose issue preclusion despite inconsistent judgments, in which there is
a known number of plaintiffs, and in which parties expect future disputes to go
to trial.5 3 Generalizing the results to include an uncertain number of plaintiffs
and parties which expect future cases to settle would add little to our under-
standing of issue preclusion, so I do not do so. Rather, I will only present the
algebraic results in the stylized world in which a defendant's victory acts as a
complete bar against future issue preclusion (V).
If a defendant's victory in her first trial bars issue preclusion, a victory no
longer puts her in the same situation as a settlement. If she wins at trial, future
plaintiffs' settlements need not reflect the possibility of issue preclusion. Exclud-
ing litigation costs, the expected liability from going to trial will be the same
whether or not parties expect future cases to go to trial. However, expected
settlements, and hence the implications of issue preclusion, differ markedly.
A. CASE 1: PARTIES EXPECT FUTURE CASES TO GO TO TRIAL
If parties expect all future disputes to go to trial, the defendant's reservation
settlement value is the difference between her expected liability from going to
trial this period and her expected liability from going to trial next period
discounted by the time value of money and the probability that another plaintiff
will file and she will indeed have to go to trial again. That is,
[31 RVT =XVT -M,,,SXVT,,,.
If a defendant goes to trial, she faces expected liability of
N-n N-n N-n[4] XVTn=P ( Mak8kW k) +(1 -P)(E MkP Wn) +E Mak8kC.
k-0 kwl k-
Thus, the defendant's reservation settlement value is 4
N-n
[5a] RVTa=C+Pn W +MaI3P(1 _PI)W ,+(P -P ,)(E M,,kS(1-P,,,) WO,)
k-I
and the expected settlement"5 is
[6a] EVT =P W +1 [M P (1 -P)W,,, )(-P W
n n n 2 t, tkw2
53. Note, 105 Harv L Rev at 1954 (cited in note 14).
54. Equations that denote the same material with slightly different assumptions will
be denoted a, b, c, etc.
55. This assumes RVT,,<RVT,. Obviously, if this equation does not hold, set-
tlement will not take place and the expected return will be just the expected verdict minus
litigation costs.
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As parties only know the distribution from which the future plaintiffs will be
drawn, the defendant's reservation settlement value is
N-nt
[Sb] RVTd.=C+PW+Mni5P (1P)W+(Pn-P)(1-P)W(> Mnk(1
k-1
and the expected settlement is
1 N-n[6b] EVT.=PnWn+ [M. ,'P (1-P) W+(Pn-P)(1-P)W( M ,nk)].
k 2
In the specialized case of a known number of plaintiffs and no discounting, the
defendant's reservation settlement value is
[5c] R VTd=C +P W +P(-P) W+(P -P)(1 -P) W(N-n -2)
and the expected settlement is
[6c] EVT=P W+ [P(1-P) W+(P-P)(1-P)W(N-n-2)]
for n<N-2.
Note that all versions of equations 5 and 6 are not strictly increasing in the
number of plaintiffs remaining but depend on the relationship between the
plaintiff's probability of victory and the mean probability of victory of all
plaintiffs.
1. Blind justice.
If P, = P for all n (all parties have an identical chance of prevailing on the
issue; justice is blind), then the defendant's reservation settlement value becomes
[5d] RVTd.=C+PW+M,,P(l-P) W
and the expected settlement value becomes
[6d] EVT =PW W].
Except for the fact that the probability that one more plaintiff will file
should decrease as the number of plaintiffs that have previously filed increases,
the plaintiff's settlement is completely invariant to the plaintiff's position in line.
In the extreme case, a world in which there is a known number of plaintiffs, the
expected return from suing is the same for all plaintiffs except the last plaintiff.
This example demonstrates one possibly unfortunate consequence of issue
preclusion: issue preclusion may give a greater percentage benefit to those with
a low probability of winning. If all plaintiffs suffered the same damages and all
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suits would settle, the percentage increase in the return is given by (1/2)Mn,5(1-
P), which is obviously decreasing in the probability of victory.
2. Less-than-blind justice.
Note that for P,>P, all versions of equation 6 are increasing in N-n; for P,<P,
equation 6 is decreasing in N-n. This is just the algebraic form of the result that
issue preclusion benefits attractive plaintiffs disproportionately and that these
plaintiffs can settle for more the earlier they sue. For the relatively unattractive
plaintiff, P,<P by a substantial amount, it is possible for the expected settlement
to be lower than that which would be received under no issue preclusion. The
magnitude of the second and third terms of equation 6 will determine whether
issue preclusion benefits or harms a given unattractive plaintiff. If it is likely that
a substantial number of plaintiffs would follow, N-n is large in the case of a
known number of plaintiffs, or the probability that many future plaintiffs will
arrive is high, it is possible that the third term will dominate and a plaintiff
would be better off without issue preclusion. It is even possible that issue
preclusion would preclude settlement. This would be the case when
N/-
[7] W(1-P)[MnlP d+(Pn-P)(E M 5")]<2C.
k=2
B. CASE 2: PARTIES EXPECT SETTLEMENT
If parties expect all future cases to settle, the defendant's reservation
settlement value is now the difference between her expected liabilities from going
to trial this period and the discounted sum of all future settlements. That is,
[8a] R VS =XVSn -M, 1,LVS n1
or
N-n
[8b] R VSd,,=XVS -_ M , k5EVS*.
k.I
Expected liability from going to trial is similar to that found in Case 1 with
only expected litigation costs changing:
N-n Nl-n
[91 XvS =C+P( Mnk8kW ,k)+(1 -PJ T Mn 5kP W ).
k-O k=1
This yields a reservation settlement value of
N-[10] R VSdn=C+PnW +(1-_P) W[E_ Ml 5k(P -P+ P)
and an expected settlement of
N-[lla] EVS n=P nW + (1_P) W[E Mn,k(pj~p+_P)I.
k=1 2
[2:663
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Equation [1la] implies that issue preclusion willenhance the effect of judicial
bias in this case as well. If the plaintiff has a relatively high probability of
victory, the second term will be quite large. If the plaintiff has a very low
probability of victory and the number of remaining plaintiffs is high, the second
term may be negative.
Note that even if all plaintiffs have an identical probability of prevailing at
trial, settlement is still increasing in the number of remaining plaintiffs:
[11b] EVS ( N-n P
2 k-1I
Equation [11b] is increasing in (N-n); however, the expected settlement ap-
proaches a limit when k becomes large and the sequence P/2 k approaches 0.
VII. Conclusion
Offensive, non-mutual issue preclusion increases a defendant's expected
liability. However, to the extent that a defendant may reduce the threat of future
issue preclusion by winning some decisions, the increase in the liability is greatly
reduced.
To the extent that the defendant may reduce the threat of future issue
preclusion by winning some decisions, any biases inherent in our judicial system
will be aggravated. A defendant will offer large settlements to those plaintiffs
with relatively high probabilities of victory to avoid the threat of issue preclusion
resulting from a loss to one of these plaintiffs. The defendant may refuse to settle
with those plaintiffs with a very low relative probability of victory in the hope of
establishing a record of victories to avoid paying enhanced settlements to future
plaintiffs and to prevent future issue preclusion should the defendant lose a
future trial. Thus, issue preclusion may exacerbate biases inherent in our judicial
system.
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